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ABSTRACT
Social media and other internet communications have altered the way
people communicate with one another, including the way people
threaten one another. In 2015, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Elonis v. United States, which imposed a heightened mental state
requirement for federal prosecutions of threats issued in interstate
commerce. Although the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), has no mental
state requirement, the Supreme Court held that, consistent with the
principles of criminal law, only those with guilty minds should be con-
victed and thus some showing of subjective intent is required. The opin-
ion did not name the requisite mental state, but concluded that
negligence was insufficient. In addition, the opinion did not discuss the
First Amendment issue at all, making it entirely unclear whether the
Court thinks a heightened mental state is required by the First Amend-
ment’s narrow exception to free speech for “true threats.” Following
the opinion, the lower courts are tasked with determining both what is
the appropriate mental state and determining if this mental state suffi-
ciently protects speech under the First Amendment.
The case law surrounding Elonis reveals a bigger problem in this area:
the lack of an appropriate criminal statute punishing threatening com-
munications in a world where internet communication is increasingly
frequent. Communication through social media or other internet media
is different from face-to-face communication because the anonymity al-
lows for people to say things they might not be comfortable saying in
person, and the unique attributes of social media platforms (e.g.
“likes,” or “retweets”) allow for a different type of communication
about one’s opinions and thoughts. This Note will argue that Elonis
demonstrated the current level of confusion in this area of the law and
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the appropriate next step is for Congress to pass legislation geared
toward internet threats that is specifically tailored for social media and
other internet communication and that identifies the mental state re-
quired for conviction. First, this Note explores the statute currently
used to prosecute internet threats and the problems that Elonis created.
Next, it addresses why the Court’s failure to explain the First Amend-
ment’s relation to subjective intent and “true threats” further confuses
an already muddled area of law. The Note then evaluates the possible
mental state requirements and the academic and legal arguments re-
garding which is most appropriate for online threats. Finally, this Note
calls for Congress to step into the online threat arena, and draft legis-
lation that will more adequately address the unique characteristics of
social media and other internet communications, and find the best way
to aid law enforcement in internet threat prosecutions and protect citi-
zens who are threatened in this new space.
INTRODUCTION
Social media brings many benefits to the modern world and makes stay-
ing in touch with everyone around you easier than ever. Social media has
also become the place where people air their grievances. These outbursts can
take many forms: comments or statuses or tweets or messages. If someone
threatens another person’s wellbeing in person or through the mail, he or she
can be prosecuted for making that threat. Likewise, when someone uses so-
cial media to communicate a threat against an individual or a group, a seri-
ous crime has been committed and law enforcement may step in to prosecute
that offender as well.
Threats on social media can be prosecuted under federal law because of
the interstate commerce authority granted to the federal government.1 The
statute that has been used to prosecute offenders is 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
which reads: “Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”2 Notably missing from this statute is a mental
state requirement.3 The failure to include a mental state requirement led to a
circuit split over the intent required to convict under this statute.4
The Supreme Court acknowledged the circuit split and granted cert for
Elonis v. United States.5 In Elonis, rather than stating what the required
1. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2002 (2015); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 1994).
3. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2003.
4. Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States: The Next Twelve Years, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1109, 1111 (2016).
5. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001.
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mental state should be for this threat statute, the Court only held that negli-
gence was not sufficient and remanded the case.6 The Supreme Court also
did not discuss whether the First Amendment, which protects the freedom of
speech, required a heightened mental state.7 The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that speech which qualifies as a “true threat” is not protected speech
under the First Amendment,8 but the Elonis opinion did not explain how the
imposition of different mental state requirements affects this narrow excep-
tion to First Amendment protection.9 Following this case, lower courts are
still left to determine what the correct mental state is for threat prosecutions,
and the jurisprudence on true threats and First Amendment protections re-
mains muddled.10
The problem in this area of the law stems not only from an unhelpful
Supreme Court decision, but also from the use of a statute designed to
criminalize threats issued through letters in the mail and enacted long before
social media’s rise to popularity. The provision currently used to prosecute
internet threats does not adequately address the nuances of social media.
Given social media’s popularity, the interstate nature of the internet, and the
fact that social media is being used to convey threats11 and aid terrorism,12
the most desirable outcome would be for Congress to step in and more
clearly articulate what behavior is punishable by federal law. Congress could
create a new criminal provision that appropriately addresses the unique cir-
cumstances that social media entails, and include the required and appropri-
ate mental state for conviction. In crafting new legislation, Congress must
take into account that the “true threat” exception to free speech is narrow,
and the new statute must require that actionable speech be communicated
with a purposeful or knowing intent to threaten, so as to keep free speech
protection as broad as possible while still protecting public safety.
This Note will explore Elonis and the turmoil that has arisen in its wake
as to appropriate mental state for conviction and what the First Amend-
ment’s freedom of speech requires, and argue that clarity from Congress is
urgently needed. Part One will address social media, the statute currently
6. Brian D. Hayes, United States v. Elonis: Changing the Intent Requirement of Fed-
eral Threatening Communication Violations, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 635, 637 (2016).
7. Quek, supra note 4, at 1111.
8. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); For the definition of “true threat,”
see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”).
9. Quek, supra note 4, at 1111.
10. Id. at 1127.
11. Alison J. Best, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold Individual Rights to
Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True Threats, 75 MD. L. REV. 1127, 1127
(2016).
12. Jack Nicas, Sam Schechner, & Deepa Seetharaman, Online Terrorist Propaganda
Still a Challenge for Tech Companies, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/online-terrorist-propaganda-still-a-challenge-for-tech-companies-1496712112.
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used to prosecute online threats, and the details of the Elonis opinion. Part
Two will address the history of true threat jurisprudence and First Amend-
ment protections, and will discuss the potential mental state requirements
and the arguments that have been used to support each one. Finally, Part
Four will be a call for clarity from Congress to choose the appropriate
mental state to protect the freedom of speech in internet threat prosecutions
and craft a new statute to embrace the nuanced form of communication that
is social media.
I. SOCIAL MEDIA, THE TANGENTIAL STATUE, AND ELONIS
A. Background on Social Media and the Incompatibility
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
Social media is a novel form of communication and expression. There
are a variety of different forums, and the way a user may communicate var-
ies between these forums. Understanding the nuances of the various social
media websites will aid in understanding why prosecution under the current
law is unsatisfactory.
The term “social media” covers a variety of online communication fo-
rums through which individuals form online communities to share thoughts,
photos, and other internet content with others in their community.13 The first
widespread social media forum was Friendster, launched in 2002, and many
others followed from 2003 to 2012.14 Four of the popular social media net-
works used today (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr) will be dis-
cussed briefly to indicate the nuances of this form of communication.
Understanding the nuances of these forums would be relevant should Con-
gress attempt to draft legislation that adequately addresses the unique meth-
ods of expression on social media sites.
Facebook, currently the most popular forum,15 allows users to set up a
personal profile, viewable by others, where they can share posts, photos, and
other internet content with others in their communities. Connected individu-
als are called “friends,” and privacy settings allow users to limit the
viewability of their profiles to friends, friends of friends, or all Facebook
users. Individuals can either post their own content, including status updates
or uploaded photos and videos, to a general news feed, or share the content
directly with another user by posting on that user’s profile or sending a di-
rect, private message. A “status update” is where a user posts text or photos
13. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2013), http://www.merriamwebster.com/
dictionary/social%20media.
14. David A. Bell, Social Media Accounts and Ownership Rights, 33 CORP. COUNS.
REV. 1, 2 (2014).
15. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015 2 (PEW RE-
SEARCH CENTER 2015).
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to share with others in the user’s community. Users can also “like” (a small
thumbs-up symbol) or comment on other’s shared content.
Twitter allows users to share information with others in a slightly differ-
ent manner than Facebook. On Twitter, users can send out “Tweets,”16
which are viewable by all of their followers.17 It is possible to tweet “at”
someone specific by hyperlinking their Twitter name, but this will still be
available for all of one’s followers to see. In addition, users can send private,
direct messages to other users. To communicate with those whom one fol-
lows, users can “like” another’s tweet (similar to Facebook), or “retweet” the
tweet, which will share that other person’s tweet with the user’s followers.
Retweets include the name of the original poster, in addition to the user who
retweeted the content.
Instagram allows users to set up an account and share photos and videos
with followers.18 The modes of communication on Instagram include posting
your own content, “liking” or commenting on another person’s post, or send-
ing a direct private message to another user.
Tumblr is a “microblogging” platform.19 Tumblr was designed to allow
users to produce short blogs, as well as to share content including photos,
quotes, links, music, and videos.20 In addition to sharing one’s own content,
users can share posts by other individuals.21
There are three aspects of these forums that present a challenge to law
enforcement looking for threats and should be taken into account by new
legislation specifically geared toward social media threats. First, the context
in which the posts were made may be hard to determine, as well as the
seriousness or sarcasm that the user intends to portray. This can make under-
standing the user’s intent difficult. Second, the ability for users to share con-
tent posted by other users also creates confusion for law enforcement and
prosecutors who are trying to determine someone’s intent. It may not be
clear if someone is reposting or sharing content to promote it, bring negative
attention to it, or signal that he or she agrees with it. Finally, someone could
issue a threatening statement generally as a status update or tweet, but actu-
ally intend for it to target a specific individual or group. This distinction in
method of communication can be relevant to determine the issuer’s mental
state. Determining the poster’s mental state is essential, because only a state-
16. Tweets are limited to 280 characters, but can include hyperlinks to videos or news
content. Tweets can also include pictures. The content of a tweet is up to the user, but often
includes opinions, personal updates, or other thoughts.
17. One connects with another person by “following” them, and these people are called
the user’s “followers.”
18. The “following” function is similar to Twitter.
19. Tumblr, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/27517/tumblr (last
visited July 24, 2017).
20. Id.
21. This type of “sharing” is comparable to a retweet on Twitter.
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ment issued with a serious intent to threaten harm is a “true threat,” and thus
excluded from First Amendment free speech protection.22
The provision currently used to prosecute online threats is found within
a section of the United States Code titled, “Interstate Communications,”23
under a chapter of the Code addressing Extortion and Threats. The provision
has four parts, each dealing with a different type of threat or extortion situa-
tion; two contain a mental state requirement and two do not.24 The two pro-
visions that do require intent require, “intent to extort.”25 The legislative
history offers no guidance on why an intent element was left out from the
other two provisions.26 Subsection (c), used to prosecute interstate threats
(and thus online threats), is one of the provisions without an intent element.27
Enacted in 1948, the conduct Congress had in mind was not social me-
dia, but rather interstate mail or telephone calls.28 The statute was most re-
cently updated in 1994, still before the age of social media,29 and the
language does not reference any electronic communication. Rather, the 1994
updates amended the amount of money referenced in the extortion provi-
sions, but did not alter subsection (c), the interstate threat provision, at all.30
Although Congress has adapted to the age of the internet by implementing a
cyberstalking provision into the United States Code,31 Congress has not up-
dated the Interstate Communications provision to better suit internet threats.
B. Elonis v. United States
In Elonis, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of issuing
threats into interstate commerce.32 His conviction stemmed from several
Facebook posts, communicated as “status updates,” which means they were
available for his entire friend list to see.33 After separating from his wife, the
defendant changed his Facebook name to “Tone Dougie,” and posted angry
22. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
23. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875 (West 1994).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Madison Peak, The Implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Elonis v.
United States for Victims of Domestic Violence, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 587, 595
(2016).
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 1994) (“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.”).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Pennell, 144 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
29. See Bell, supra, note 14, at 2 (explaining the rise of a variety of social media
networks).
30. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PL 103-322, Sept. 13,
1994, 108 Stat. 1796.
31. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (West 2013).
32. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
33. Id. at 2004.
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rants and rap lyrics using violent language on his account.34 The posts that
led to conviction were about his former place of employment (an amusement
park and its patrons), his ex-wife, and law enforcement agents.35 The first
post about the defendant’s wife was styled as a satirical skit, and included
phrases like, “the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be
from the cornfield behind it because of easy access to a getaway road and
you’d have a clear line of sight through the sun room,” and even included a
diagram of the home.36 After that, the defendant’s wife got a restraining
order against him, which prompted more hateful posts. The first was about
his wife and was styled as lyrics to a rap song, including lines like, “Fold up
your [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket. Is it thick
enough to stop a bullet?”37 In this same post, the defendant also mentioned
local law enforcement: “I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the State
Police and the Sheriff’s Department.”38 Following an interview with FBI
agents, the defendant again posted an angry rant styled as rap lyrics, target-
ing the agent with phrases like, “Took all the strength I had not to turn the
b**** ghost. Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat. Leave her
bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner.”39 Although many of the
posts singled out individuals, they were not sent in a direct message to any
individuals, but rather were issued in a public nature as a status update. The
defendant testified that these lyrics were not intended to be a threat, but were
his version of artistic expression; the defendant compared this expression to
the lyrics of Eminem, a famous rap artist who often wrote lyrics about harm-
ing estranged women in his life.40
The language of the threats was direct and specific, and targeted individ-
uals by name or other identifying factors.41 At trial, the jury was instructed
that:
 A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes
a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a rea-
sonable person would foresee that the statement would be inter-
preted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take
the life of an individual.42
34. Id. at 2005.
35. Id. at 2004.
36. Id. at 2005.
37. Id. at 2006.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2007.
41. Id. at 2005-07.
42. Id. at 2007 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court characterized this language as requiring an objective
standard of intent, which focused on how a reasonable person would inter-
pret the statements.43
In remanding the case, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
concluded that this objective standard was insufficient to sustain a criminal
conviction under the statute.44 Although the statute contains no intent ele-
ment, the Court indicated that some subjective finding of what the defen-
dant’s intent was in communicating the statements is necessary.45 The Court,
however, failed to explain what that subjective intent finding should entail.
There are four generally accepted mental state requirements: purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.46 In rejecting the objective standard,
the Court explicitly stated that “negligently” is not sufficient.47 The Court
reasoned that a statement issued, “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with
knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat,” would indis-
putably satisfy the implied intent requirement of the statute.48 The Court
declined to answer whether or not “recklessness,” where the defendant
makes the statement with reckless disregard to the risk that the statement
will be viewed as a threat, would satisfy the mental state requirement.49 Al-
though the concurrence, written by Justice Alito, makes clear that reckless-
ness would suffice,50 the majority opinion does not answer the question.
In addition, the majority opinion in Elonis does not discuss whether or
not the First Amendment’s freedom of speech requires a heightened intent
element.51 In fact, it does not reach the First Amendment analysis at all.52
Although most speech is protected by the First Amendment, “true threats”
are not.53 This is a narrow exception to the First Amendment protection of
free speech however, and the majority opinion does not articulate which
mental state requirement would be consistent with this narrow exception.
The defendant argued that without a heightened mental state requirement,
like purposeful intent or knowing intent, the statute would violate his free-
dom of speech.54 However, the majority determined that, given its disposi-
43. Id. at 2011.
44. Id. at 2012.
45. Id. at 2011.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
47. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
48. Id. at 2012.
49. Id. (declining to reach a decision on “recklessness” because the majority claimed
that the issue was not properly briefed). But see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that, to be found guilty, the jury must find that the
defendant acted at least recklessly as to whether his or her statement issued a threat).
50. Id. at 2014.
51. Quek, supra note 4, at 1111.
52. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
53. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
54. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016.
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tion, it did not need to reach the First Amendment discussion55 and thus the
defendant’s argument went unanswered. In his concurrence, Justice Alito
addressed the First Amendment issue and concluded that a mental state re-
quirement of “recklessness” would still satisfy the First Amendment protec-
tion of freedom of speech.56 The defendant argued that his statements were
made as a version of artistic expression, similar to popular rap lyrics, not
intended to threaten, and thus are protected by the First Amendment.57 Jus-
tice Alito dismisses this argument because of the context in which the state-
ments were made and the direct nature of the threats.58
On remand in Elonis, the Third Circuit upheld the convictions.59 The
Third Circuit first addressed the newly required subjective analysis in inter-
state threat convictions.60 The Court concluded that, “to satisfy the subjec-
tive component of Section 875(c), the Government must demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant transmitted a communication
for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communica-
tion would be viewed as a threat.”61 The Third Circuit, by making that state-
ment, foreclosed the opportunity to convict based on a “recklessness” mental
state showing.62
II. ISSUES PERPETUATED BY ELONIS AND 18 U.S.C. § 875(C)
There are two separate problems which stem from the Elonis decision.
The first problem concerns the failure by the Supreme Court to address the
First Amendment argument as it relates to true threats. By failing to do so,
the jurisprudence on true threats remains muddled and lower courts are
likely to struggle to determine what language is a true threat and how the
speaker’s intent implicates the First Amendment’s freedom of speech. The
second problem is that the Supreme Court did not conclusively decide
whether recklessness would be sufficient to convict under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). Lower courts are now tasked with deciding if the required intent
must be purposefully or knowingly, or whether recklessly will suffice.63 The
55. Id. at 2012 (“Given our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any First Amend-
ment issues.”).
56. Id. at 2016.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 601 (3d Cir. 2016).
60. Id. at 596.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 601 (The Court follows this conclusion by determining whether the flawed
jury instructions were harmless to the outcome. After addressing the violent and direct nature
of the defendant’s Facebook posts, the Court concludes that the error was harmless and up-
holds the convictions.).
63. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Did
the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if
he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court de-
clines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.”).
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two problems are related because, as will hopefully become clear, the true
threat exception to the First Amendment’s freedom of speech is only found
where the speech intends to threaten significant harm to others64 and, after
Elonis, the speaker’s mental state is the method used to measure that intent.65
A. The First Amendment, Elements of a Threat, and Online Terrorism
The failure by the Supreme Court in Elonis to address the First Amend-
ment issue left an already confusing area of the law in further disarray: true
threats. The Supreme Court neglected the opportunity to clarify this area of
the law in Elonis and did not address whether subjective intent is required
for First Amendment purposes.66 The true threat exception to the First
Amendment is narrow and it will be helpful to understand what elements of
a threatening statement that Courts have found make that statement a “true
threat,” and thus satisfy this narrow exception. In addition, the First Amend-
ment true threat discussion extends to terrorism threats made online, and any
improvement in online threat prosecution must acknowledge the implica-
tions on terrorism, which is being furthered through the use of the internet
and social media.
1. Free Speech and the True Threat Exception
The First Amendment Offers Citizens the Freedom of Speech.67 How-
ever, this Freedom is not without limits.68 The government may not regulate
speech where it finds that it is “distasteful,” but rather only when the lan-
guage is “ ‘of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may be
derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.’ ”69 “True threats” are one of the few exceptions to the freedom of
speech under that description.70 Although there is a presumption to protect
speech, the Court has held that true threats pose significant harm to others71
64. Id. at 2016.
65. Id. at 2012.
66. See U.S. v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220 (2016) (“But, importantly, the Court’s holding
in Elonis was purely statutory; and, having resolved the question on statutory grounds, the
Court declined to address whether a similar subjective intent to threaten is a necessary compo-
nent of a “true threat” for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
68. Black, 538 U.S. at 344 (“The protections the First Amendment affords speech and
expressive conduct are not absolute. This Court has long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”).
69. Id. at 358-59.
70. Id. at 359.
71. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016.
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and that true threats fall outside of the scope of constitutionally protected
free speech.72
The true threat exception to free speech is however, narrow, and the
government faces a heavy burden when trying to prove that someone’s
words are not protected.73 The jurisprudence on true threats indicates that the
exception applies to language where, “the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.”74 This definition of “true
threats” from Virginia v. Black, written by the Supreme Court over a decade
before Elonis was decided, explicitly requires a demonstration of intent on
behalf of the speaker.75 This intent element is analogous to the mens rea
requirement discussed in Elonis, but the Supreme Court did not take the
opportunity in Elonis to clarify whether the subjective mental state now re-
quired is necessary under both the First Amendment and the statute (18
U.S.C. § 875(c)), or the statute alone.76 In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme
Court directly states that language communicated with intent to threaten is
not protected,77 and it should not be surprising that the Court in Elonis re-
quired more than mere negligence. However, although it seems that the
Court in Black required a showing of intent for true threats under a First
Amendment analysis, the Court in Elonis neglected to confirm that it would
require a showing of intent for the same reason.
The Court has noted that the harm from true threats stems from the fear
incited by the language itself.78 Under Elonis, if the speaker intends to incite
fear, he or she has issued a statement with intent to threaten.79 However,
because the Court did not pursue any First Amendment analysis under the
interstate threat statute and instead relied on issues of statutory construction,
there is renewed confusion regarding the scope of “true threats.” The injury
from a threat is the fear that the recipient feels and the purpose of prosecut-
ing threats is to protect the recipient from that fear.80 Without clarification
on this issue from the Court however, it is unclear if the intent to incite fear
fits within the narrow First Amendment exception of “true threats,” or if that
intent more closely aligns with “distasteful,” but protected, speech. Follow-
ing Elonis, the only conclusion one can be sure of is that subjective intent is
72. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
73. Id. (holding that the statements made regarding the President were not threats, but
rather were made to voice opposition to the President).
74. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
75. Id.
76. See White, 810 F.3d at 220.
77. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
78. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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required under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).81 One is still left to wonder if subjective
intent is similarly required under First Amendment “true threat” doctrine.82
2. Common Elements of True Threats
Although 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), does not require or list any specific ele-
ments to constitute a “threat,”83 the case law, particularly that following
Elonis, indicates that there are certain elements that provide support for a
finding that the speaker had a subjective intent to threaten. Considering the
relationship between subjective intent under the statute and intent required
under First Amendment jurisprudence, a finding of these elements bolsters
the argument that this speech should not be protected speech.84
Following Elonis, many circuit courts were faced with appeals based on
incorrect jury instructions.85 In these cases, the lower courts used jury in-
structions that required the objective reasonable person standard, but did not
include the subjective intent element now required by Elonis.86 Nonetheless,
the federal circuit courts of appeal have affirmed convictions in some cases,
even where the jury instructions were insufficient according to the new
Elonis standard.87
There appear to be three factual elements that, where present, the courts
are likely to affirm the conviction. These factual elements have convinced
the federal circuit courts that the jury would have convicted even under the
correct, more exacting subjective intent instructions, and thus indicate that a
true threat has been issued. Courts most often confirm the convictions where
the threats: 1) are made directly to the threatened individual, 2) include spe-
cific threatened acts, and 3) contain especially violent desires to harm or
kill.88 Where one element, or a combination of these elements, is present, the
courts have determined that a reasonable jury would find that the defendant
had the subjective intent to issue a threat and the incorrect jury instructions
were harmless.89
81. Id.
82. See White, 810 F.3d at 220.
83. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 2014).
84. Because the true threat exception is narrow, the required elements of true threats
must indicate that the statements were intended to harm, rather than just distasteful. See Watts,
394 U.S. at 707.
85. See, e.g., White, 810 F.3d 212; United States v. Haddad, 652 F. App’x 460 (7th Cir.
2016); United States v. Choudhry, 649 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2016).
86. See, e.g., White, 810 F.3d at 221.
87. See, e.g., Haddad, 652 F. App’x at 462; Choudhry, 649 F. App’x at 63; United
States v. Jordan, 639 F. App’x 768, 770 (2d Cir. 2016); White, 810 F.3d at 221.
88. See Choudhry, 649 F. App’x at 63; Jordan, 639 F. App’x at 770; White, 810 F.3d at
222.
89. See, e.g., Choudhry, 649 F. App’x at 63 (“For instance, the evidence included . . .
recorded conversations in which Choudhry stated to his daughter Amina, ‘Until I find you
nothing is going to stop. I’m going to kill their whole family. . . . I will keep shooting at them,
until you come back home . . . I will kill myself and also make sure I kill all of them.’
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These specific and violent elements relate back to the definition of “true
threats” from Supreme Court jurisprudence: “the speaker means to commu-
nicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vio-
lence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”90 Such direct and
violent language must be required elements to constitute a true threat in or-
der for courts to stay true to the narrow exception made from First Amend-
ment protection. Likewise, Elonis’s addition of a heightened mental state
requirement to the interstate threat provision is consistent with this narrow
exception to the doctrine of free speech.91
3. Online Spread of Terrorism
Unfortunately, true threat jurisprudence will likely take a new turn in the
near future because of the role that social media plays in planning and
recruiting for terrorist groups.92 In Elonis, one individual used social media
to express direct threats toward specific targets.93 However, terrorist groups
are using social media to recruit members, spread their message, plan at-
tacks, and incite violence around the globe.94 Because of the First Amend-
ment protections of freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom
of association, law enforcement officials may not intervene merely because
an individual subscribes to these sites or makes comments in support of ter-
rorist groups.95 In order to use § 875(c) to prosecute supporters or inciters of
these groups, the government would need to satisfy the subjective intent ele-
ment required under Elonis.96 Doing so may be even more difficult in the
terrorism context, due to the often secretive planning and broad natured at-
tacks used by these groups, rather than direct threats to one or two
individuals.
The complexity of these situations will likely turn on the intricacies of
social media platforms themselves and it is imperative that courts appropri-
ately navigate the fine line between protected speech under the First Amend-
ment and true threats. Proving one’s intent to threaten because he or she
“liked” a Facebook post or “retweeted” a terrorist group on Twitter will not
be an easy task and the new Elonis standard requiring a heighten demonstra-
tion of intent to threaten makes that task even harder. In 2016, federal law
enforcement charged a woman with violating § 875(c) based on her
Choudhry further stated, ‘If you don’t come back, I will kill each and every one of them. I will
go to jail,’ and explained, ‘we had to threaten them . . . in order to have them bring you back to
us.’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
90. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
91. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
92. See Taylor Spencer, Twitter in the Age of Terrorism: Can a Retweet Constitute a
“True Threat”?, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 497 (2017).
93. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004-07.
94. Spencer, supra note 92, at 499.
95. Id. at 503.
96. Id. at 503-04.
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“retweets” of ISIS threats naming specific federal law enforcement of-
ficers.97 She was indicted by a grand jury in February 2017, and the district
court affirmed the indictment in April 2017.98 The outcome of this case will
prove to be very informative, and will indicate the direction of true threat
jurisprudence where social media and terrorism intersect. Unlike in Elonis, if
this case reaches the Supreme Court the Court will be unable to avoid the
First Amendment discussion pertaining to the defendant’s conduct. This
should result in some clarification regarding what “intent” is required under
the “true threat” exception to the First Amendment.
B. Appropriate Mental State for Online Threat Convictions
Similarly to the First Amendment issue, the Court in Elonis also did not
provide an answer as to which mental state should be used to prosecute
interstate threats. Although the Supreme Court did indicate that knowingly
or purposefully would be sufficient, the Court did not provide an answer
with respect to “recklessness.”99 Legal scholars have voiced their opinions
regarding which mental state requirement is appropriate in the social media
threat context following Elonis: some arguing for purposeful or knowing
conduct, others arguing for recklessness. In addition, several federal circuit
courts have been confronted with cases following Elonis that require them to
make sense of the Supreme Court’s holding.100
1. Scholars Arguing for Knowledge/Purpose
The two most exacting mental state possibilities under the Model Penal
Code are purposely and knowingly.101 These mental states are the hardest for
the government to prove.102 The Model Penal Code explains “purposely” to
mean that the defendant acted where, “it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result,” that is described in the
applicable statute.103 The “knowingly” mental state means that the defen-
dant, “is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
97. See Spencer, supra note 92, at 505; See also United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-
01-CR-S-MDH, 2017 WL 1324141 at *1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).
98. United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-01-CR-S-MDH, 2017 WL 1337438 at *1
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2017).
99. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
100. See, e.g., United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212; United States v. Caldwell, 75 M.J.
276 (C.A.A.F.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 248 (2016); State v. Trey M., 383 P.3d 474 (Wash.
2016).
101. See supra, note 46.
102. Maria A. Brusco, Read This Note or Else!: Conviction Under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for
Recklessly Making a Threat, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2845, 2853 (2016).
103. See supra, note 46.
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exist,” again referencing the conduct prohibited by the statute.104 Purposely
and knowingly are often used interchangeably or together as one.105
Some scholars argue purposely/knowingly is the appropriate mental
state requirement for § 875(c) and the one most likely to be selected by the
Supreme Court.106 First, using one of these higher mental state standards is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s goal in Elonis of distinguishing wrong-
ful from innocent conduct.107 In order to only convict those who are morally
culpable, it is essential to only convict based on actual wrongful conduct.108
These scholars argue that limiting convictions for online threats to those who
acted purposely or knowingly comports with that goal.109
Second, a knowledge or purpose standard is more likely to comport with
the demands of the First Amendment.110 As already discussed, true threats
are not protected speech under the First Amendment.111 In order to limit the
government’s ability to impede on the free speech doctrine, a heightened
mental state is required because this narrows the potential application of the
true threat exception to a limited number of cases.112
2. Scholars Arguing for Recklessness
Under the Model Penal Code, the next most exacting mental state is
“recklessness.”113 The Model Penal Code describes recklessness as, “A per-
son acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct.”114 The Model Penal Code
further explains that reckless behavior is that which “grossly deviates” from
that of a law-abiding citizen.115 A recklessness demonstration requires evi-
dence of more wrongful intent than negligence, but not quite as much as
purposely or knowingly.
104. Id.
105. Brusco, supra note 102, at 2853.
106. See Maris Snell, Section 875(c): Not for All Intents and Purposes, 68 FLA. L. REV.
1495, 1504-07 (2016); see also Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110
NW. L. REV. 995, 1005 (2016) (arguing that knowingly/purposely is appropriate for threats
against public figures); John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally
Protected Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 673-74 (2016) (arguing that techno-
logical advances require a heightened mens rea analysis and recklessness is insufficient); En-
rique A. Monagas & Carlos E. Monagas, Prosecuting Threats in the Age of Social Media, 36
N. ILL. L. REV. 57, 77 (2016) (arguing that a recklessness standard would chill speech and thus
a heightened mental state requirement is necessary).
107. Snell, supra note 106, at 1504.
108. Id. at 1505.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1506.
111. See supra Part II.A.
112. Snell, supra note 106, at 1506-07.
113. See supra note 46.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Although no court has given a definitive answer, some scholars argue
that “recklessness” is the appropriate mental state requirement for § 875(c)
threat convictions.116 If the intent of the statute is to protect the victims of
threatening communications, the harm felt is just as severe when the speaker
knew the communication was a threat or acted recklessly in making a state-
ment that could have the damaging effect of a threat, then proving that the
defendant acted purposely makes no difference in protecting the victim.117
Thus, these scholars suggest “recklessness” more accurately comports with
the purpose of the statute.118
As for the First Amendment issue, these scholars contend that reckless-
ness is enough to protect an individual’s right to free speech.119 Recklessness
analysis depends on the context in which the threat was made, and some
suggest that this contextual analysis sufficiently protects free speech.120 If
the statements are made in a context where they will not be taken seriously
as a threat, the defendant is not acting recklessly with regard to his commu-
nications.121 If the context analysis cuts the other way, then the reckless
speaker is not entitled to free speech protection for his communications,
whose harm to victims outweighs his right to free speech.122
3. Federal Circuit Court Response
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Elonis and con-
cluded that in order to convict under § 875(c), the government must show
that the defendant: 1) knowingly transmits a communication into interstate
commerce, 2) subjectively intended the communication as a threat, and 3)
the communication contained a true threat.123 The second element is where
the question of which mental state is appropriate comes into play: where the
intent of the speaker is considered. Under this element, courts and juries
should consider the statements in the context in which they were made and
evaluate the language used. This should allow for a determination of
whether the defendant subjectively intended to threaten the subject (illegal),
or whether the defendant intended to speak hateful but not threatening words
(protected under the First Amendment).124
116. Brusco, supra note 102, at 2870; see also Pierce, supra note 106, at 1005 (arguing
that recklessness is the appropriate standard for threats made against private individuals);
Quek, supra note 4, at 1135 (arguing inconclusively that recklessness might be the appropriate
mental state).
117. Brusco, supra note 102, at 2870.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2871.
120. Id. at 2873.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2872.
123. White, 810 F.3d at 220-21.
124. See Elonis 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
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All federal circuit courts that have been confronted with the issue agree
that a knowingly or purposefully mental state would be sufficient; that is a
demonstration that the defendant knew the communication would be viewed
as a threat or issued the communication with the purpose of issuing a threat
would be sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement of a subjec-
tive intent element.125 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits required the subjective
intent element even before Elonis, and required a showing of knowledge or
purpose.126 No federal circuit courts have definitively held that recklessness
would be sufficient.127 Courts have addressed the possibility in dicta,128 but
have not been confronted with a defendant demonstrating a recklessness
mental state. It is not clear what the outcome will be should those factual
circumstances arise.
III. CALL FOR CLARITY
The speed, global reach, and evolving mature of social media make it
Imperative that Law enforcement has a clear handle on what constitutes an
internet threat. True threat litigation has increased over the past decade as
social media use has increased.129 Because of the increased ease of commu-
nication that social media brings and the anonymity users feel when post-
ing,130 it is more important than ever to determine an appropriate mental
state requirement for true threats and ensure that a statute exists to appropri-
ately address online threats without infringing on Frist Amendment free
speech protections.131
A. Knowingly/Purposely is the Best fit for Online Threats
Despite some legal scholar’s arguments that a recklessness standard is
appropriate and does not violate free speech, this Note argues that only a
demonstration of purposely or knowingly intent to threaten is sufficient to
convict someone for making an online threat. This heightened mental state
requirement will be a challenge in the context of social media posts, where
nearly all evidence will be circumstantial and the context of the situation
125. See White, 810 F.3d at 221; Haddad, 652 F. App’x at 462; Choudhry, 649 F. App’x
at 63; United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Martinez,
800 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015).
126. See United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 975 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. See White, 810 F.3d at 221; Houston, 792 F.3d at 669.
128. See, e.g., Houston, 792 F.3d at 669.
129. Best, supra note 11, at 1127 (“Because online communications tend to allow indi-
viduals to post their thoughts on a widely accessible network, courts have seen a rise in “true
threat” litigation over the past decade, which evaluates whether statements communicated by
an individual qualify as threats.”).
130. Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson, #FreeSpeech, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013, 1036
(Winter 2016).
131. See Villasenor, supra note 106, at 634.
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may be more difficult to determine as a result of the text written on the
internet.132 However, requiring a purposely or knowingly mental state will
best separate wrongful from unsavory (but not illegal) conduct, and leave
social media as free and open as possible for users to express their thoughts.
Many use social media to share thoughts and articles with their friends
about their political views and other controversial topics. Conversations with
adversaries on social media sites may get heated at times, but this dialogue is
often critical for keeping citizens informed and bringing all viewpoints to the
table. Occasionally, users may take things too far and make public state-
ments to individuals or groups of people which may be perceived as a threat.
To keep social media a free and open space for discussion, it is imperative
that we only ask law enforcement to step in when threatening words are
communicated with purposeful or knowing intent, whether to carry out the
threat or to instill real fear in the object of the threat.
To comport with that goal, any statute governing online threats should
include, or be read to include, a purposely or knowingly mental state re-
quirement. By using a heightened mental state requirement, social media
users will be free to keep using their profiles, even in times of heated anger,
without risk of federal prosecution. When one steps over the line and issues
a communication with intent to threaten, they have committed a crime and
should be punished accordingly. However, under this framework, when
one’s rant gets out of control and he or she recklessly instills fear in another
person without any intent to do so, no crime has been committed and law
enforcement should not be permitted to step in.
The likely response to this argument is that threats are harmful to the
recipients, regardless of the speaker’s intent, and should be prosecuted ac-
cordingly. However, in the interstate threat context, the United States crimi-
nal justice system aims to punish wrongful conduct, not unfortunate
results.133 The best way to do this for online threats is to require the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the speaker acted with purpose or knowledge that
the communication would be perceived as a threat. By doing so, the law
would require the recipient to bear the risk that the communication is harm-
ful, rather than the speaker, because the onus of the determination rests on
the speaker’s subjective intent and not on the effect felt by the recipient.134
While this solution is not perfect, it is the best way to protect free speech,
while still protecting the public safety when a true threat has been issued.
132. Monagas, supra note 106, at 66-67 (explaining that defendants rarely admit an in-
tention to issue a threat, so proving criminal intent will require circumstantial evidence and
facts to convince a jury that the defendant was acting purposefully or knowingly to threaten.).
133. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (“The “central thought” is that a defendant must be
“blameworthy in mind” before he can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over
time through various terms such as mens rea, scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge,
and the like.”).
134. Monagas, supra note 106, at 77.
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The Supreme Court was clear in Elonis that the speaker’s intent must mat-
ter,135 and requiring a demonstration of a heightened mental state is the best
way to balance the competing factors at issue.
B. Congressional Response
Congress should pass a new statute into law that prohibits threats made
via the internet and in the social media context. Due to the unique nature of
social media communication, a refined statute would give the most adequate
guidance to law enforcement and aid in understanding which mental state
requirement will withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Communication on
social media can be expressed through both personal posts and “liking” or
“retweeting” other’s posts. The intent and mindset behind each action may
differ, and drafting legislation to address these different actions would aid
law enforcement. If a new statute is drafted and passed, the statute should
choose a mental state requirement and include it explicitly in the language of
the statute. Further, this Note has explained why the appropriate mental state
should be purposely/knowingly. Requiring this heightened mental state will
ensure that social media communication receives the First Amendment pro-
tection that it is entitled to. Requiring this mental state will also ensure that
only those who act intentionally to threaten (and issue “true threats”) will be
prosecuted.
Alternatively, Congress could choose to act in a different way. Rather
than draft legislation to adapt to online threats by individuals, Congress
could pass legislation that requires social media platforms and other technol-
ogy companies to be more vigilant in policing their sites. German lawmakers
took this approach and passed legislation in June 2017 that would fine such
companies for failing to quickly delete hate speech, libel, and other illegal
content.136 However, this type of legislation would only accomplish part of
the goals in this area: threatening language may be deleted promptly and the
effects on victims may be less pronounced, but this legislation would offer
no guidance to law enforcement on what mental state is required for online
threat prosecutions and would not address the First Amendment issue.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis v. United States left lower courts
without an answer as to whether purposely, knowingly, or recklessly was the
appropriate mental state for 18 U.S.C. §875(c) convictions, particularly in
the internet context, and without an answer as to what is required by the First
Amendment in this space. Since that ruling in 2015, lower courts have ap-
plied the standards as they see fit. To ease this confusion, it is imperative
135. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
136. Anton Troianovski & Sam Schechner, Germany to Social Networks: Delete Hate
Speech Faster or Face Fines, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2017).
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that the federal government make explicit which mental state is required for
true threat convictions and which mental state best affords First Amendment
protections to social media users. A new statute is needed to address threats
in the internet or social media context. Clarification in this area is necessary
to aid law enforcement, inform social media users of what conduct is prohib-
ited, and protect First Amendment freedoms of U.S. citizens using these
sites as a vehicle for public communication and dialogue.
